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Equilibrium In Fiscal Competition Games From The Point Of View Of The Dual

机译：双重视角下的财政竞争博弈均衡

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摘要

Papers that examine fiscal competition for mobile factors of production commonly employ simultaneous move games between two states and focus on the inefficiency of the equilibria. Most often, the existence of the equilibrium is left unexplored. By examining decision making by governments that make only constrained efficient choices, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria when there are multiple policy instruments, multiple mobile factors and many different production processes. Convexity of the minimum cost function, "dual" to the factor preferences and production function primitives, is sufficient to ensure the existence of equilibrium. We also find that equilibrium may not exist because of the economies of scale inherent in provision of public goods which benefit mobile factors.
机译：检验财政对生产要素移动性竞争的论文通常采用两个州之间的同时移动博弈，并着重于均衡的低效率。大多数情况下，平衡的存在是无法探索的。通过检查仅做出有限有效选择的政府的决策，当存在多种政策工具，多种流动因素和许多不同的生产过程时，我们得出了存在均衡的充分条件。最小成本函数的凸性（与要素偏好和生产函数基元“对偶”）足以确保均衡的存在。我们还发现，由于提供有利于流动要素的公共物品所固有的规模经济，平衡可能不存在。

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