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Strategic defense and attack for reliability systems

机译:可靠性系统的战略防御和攻击

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摘要

This article illustrates a method by which arbitrarily complex series/parallel reliability systems can be analyzed. The method is illustrated with the series-parallel and parallel-series systems. Analytical expressions are determined for the investments and utilities of the defender and the attacker, depend on their unit costs of investment for each component, the contest intensity for each component, and their evaluations of the value of system functionality. For a series-parallel system, infinitely many components in parallel benefit the defender maximally regardless of the finite number of parallel subsystems in series. Conversely, infinitely many components in series benefit the attacker maximally regardless of the finite number of components in parallel in each subsystem. For a parallel-series system, the results are opposite. With equivalent components, equal unit costs for defender and attacker, equal intensity for all components, and equally many components in series and parallel, the defender always prefers the series-parallel system rather than the parallel-series system, and converse holds for the attacker. Hence from the defender's perspective, ceteris paribus, the series-parallel system is more reliable, and has fewer "cut sets" or failure modes.
机译:本文介绍了一种方法,通过该方法可以分析任意复杂的串联/并联可靠性系统。用串联-并联和并联-串联系统说明了该方法。确定防御者和攻击者的投资和效用的分析表达式,取决于他们对每个组件的投资单位成本,每个组件的竞争强度以及对系统功能价值的评估。对于串联-并联系统,无论多少串联的并联子系统,并联的无数部件都会最大程度地使防御者受益。相反,无论每个子系统中并行的组件数量有限,无数个串联的组件都能最大程度地使攻击者受益。对于并联系统,结果相反。在组件相等,防御者和攻击者的单位成本相等,所有组件的强度相同以及串联和并联的组件数量相等的情况下,防御者总是更喜欢串联-并联系统,而不是并联-串联系统,并且对于攻击者而言,反之亦然。因此,从后卫等人的角度来看,串并联系统更可靠,并且“割套”或故障模式更少。

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