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Why are researchers paid bonuses? On technology spillovers and market rivalry

机译：为什么研究人员要支付奖金？关于技术外溢和市场竞争

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摘要

A temporary change in pay to employed inventors around the time of patent application has been documented. A theoretical model is here developed to provide an explanation to said findings based on the idea that inventors may be able to use the knowledge previously generated while working in a firm, in a rival company. The model features firms who hire workers in R&D functions to make product innovations. The innovation process consists of distinct phases each with different access to information about the innovation value for firms. Firms compete to attract workers, and workers can transfer part of the generated new knowledge to a new employer. Results suggest that the capital intensity of R&D investments, and the type and size of knowledge spillovers, may affect the probability to observe bonus pay at the time of a patent application. Different tax incentives and subsidies are then studied as a means to correct for possible underinvestment of capital. We study the effect of a patent box, a subsidy to R&D capital investments, and a subsidy to bonus pay. When market rivalry prevails over positive knowledge externalities, a bonus pay incentive was found to obtain the social first-best while a patent box or a subsidy to capital investment would cause overinvestment. When positive knowledge externalities prevail, either a patent box or a subsidy to capital investment obtain the social optimal level of capital investments.
机译：已经记录了在专利申请期间对聘用的发明者的薪水的暂时变化。在此开发一种理论模型，以基于发明人可能能够使用先前在竞争对手公司的公司中工作时所产生的知识的思想，为上述发现提供解释。该模型的特色是雇用具有研发职能的工人进行产品创新的公司。创新过程包括不同的阶段，每个阶段都有不同的途径来获取有关企业创新价值的信息。企业竞争以吸引工人，工人可以将所产生的部分新知识转移给新雇主。结果表明，研发投资的资本强度以及知识溢出的类型和规模可能会影响专利申请时获得奖金的可能性。然后研究不同的税收优惠政策和补贴，作为纠正可能的资本投资不足的一种手段。我们研究了专利盒，对研发资本投资的补贴以及对奖金的补贴的影响。当市场竞争胜过积极的知识外部性时，人们发现了奖金奖励激励来获得社会第一名，而专利盒或对资本投资的补贴则可能导致过度投资。当积极的知识外部性盛行时，专利盒或对资本投资的补贴将获得社会最优的资本投资水平。

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