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Load Shifting in the Smart Grid: To Participate or Not?

机译：智能电网中的负载转移：是否参与？

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摘要

Demand-side management (DSM) has emerged as an important smart grid feature that allows utility companies to maintain desirable grid loads. However, the success of DSM is contingent on active customer participation. Indeed, most existing DSM studies are based on game-theoretic models that assume customers will act rationally and will voluntarily participate in DSM. In contrast, in this paper, the impact of customers' subjective behavior on each other's DSM decisions is explicitly accounted for. In particular, a noncooperative game is formulated between grid customers in which each customer can decide on whether to participate in DSM or not. In this game, customers seek to minimize a cost function that reflects their total payment for electricity. Unlike classical game-theoretic DSM studies, which assume that customers are rational in their decision-making, a novel approach is proposed based on the framework of prospect theory (PT) to explicitly incorporate the impact of customer behavior on DSM decisions. To solve the proposed game under both conventional game theory and PT, a new algorithm based on fictitious play is proposed using which the game will reach an ϵ -mixed Nash equilibrium. Simulation results are provided to assess the impact of customer behavior on DSM. In particular, the overall participation level and grid load can depend significantly on the rationality level of the players and their risk aversion tendencies.
机译：需求侧管理（DSM）已成为一项重要的智能电网功能，可让公用事业公司维持理想的电网负荷。但是，DSM的成功取决于客户的积极参与。实际上，大多数现有的DSM研究都是基于博弈论模型的，这些模型假设客户将采取合理的行动并自愿参加DSM。相反，在本文中，明确说明了客户的主观行为对彼此的DSM决策的影响。特别是，在网格客户之间制定了一个非合作游戏，其中每个客户可以决定是否参与DSM。在此游戏中，客户寻求最小化反映其总电费的成本函数。与经典的博弈论DSM研究（假设客户的决策是理性的）不同，基于前景理论（PT）的框架提出了一种新颖的方法，以明确纳入客户行为对DSM决策的影响。为了在常规博弈论和PT两种情况下解决该拟议博弈，提出了一种基于虚拟博弈的新算法，该算法将使博弈达到mix-混合Nash平衡。提供仿真结果以评估客户行为对DSM的影响。特别是，总体参与程度和网格负荷可能很大程度上取决于参与者的理性程度及其风险规避倾向。

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