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首页> 外文期刊>Social Epistemology: A Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Policy >The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary
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The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social Imaginary

机译：认知不公正的比例视角下可信度过高的相关性：差异性的认知权威和社会想象

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摘要

This paper defends a contextualist approach to epistemic injustice according to which instances of such injustice should be looked at as temporally extended phenomena (having developmental and historical trajectories) and socially extended phenomena (being rooted in patterns of social relations). Within this contextualist framework, credibility excesses appear as a form of undeserved epistemic privilege that is crucially relevant for matters of testimonial justice. While drawing on Miranda Fricker's proportional view of epistemic justice, I take issue with its lack of attention to the role that credibility excesses play in testimonial injustices. I depart from Fricker's view of the relation between credibility excesses and credibility deficits, and I offer an alternative account of the contributions that undeserved epistemic privileges make to epistemic injustices. Then, through the detailed analysis of To kill a mockingbird, I elucidate the crucial role played by the social imaginary in creating and sustaining epistemic injustices, developing an analysis of the kind of social blindness produced by an oppressive social imaginary that establishes unjust patterns of credibility excesses and deficits.View full textDownload full textKeywordsAuthority, Credibility, Epistemic Justice, Hermeneutical Justice, Social Imagination, Testimonial KnowledgeRelated var addthis_config = { ui_cobrand: "Taylor & Francis Online", services_compact: "citeulike,netvibes,twitter,technorati,delicious,linkedin,facebook,stumbleupon,digg,google,more", pubid: "ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b" }; Add to shortlist Link Permalink http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2010.534568
机译：本文捍卫了一种针对情境主义的认识论不公正的方法，根据这种方法，应将这种不公正的情况视为时间扩展现象（具有发展和历史轨迹）和社会扩展现象（植根于社会关系的模式）。在这种情境主义框架内，信誉过剩似乎是一种不当的认知特权，与证明司法公正至关重要。在借鉴米兰达·弗里克（Miranda Fricker）的认知正义的比例观点的同时，我对它缺乏关注，即过分可信度在证词不公正中所扮演的角色感到质疑。我背离了弗里克关于信誉过度与信誉赤字之间关系的观点，并且我提供了另一种说法，说明了不当的认识特权对认识不公正所做的贡献。然后，通过对“杀死一只知更鸟”的详细分析，我阐明了社会假想家在创造和维持认识上的不公正中所起的关键作用，对由压迫性社会假想家所建立的那种社会盲目性进行了分析，该假想者建立了不公正的信誉模式。查看权威全文翻译关键字权威，可信度，认知正义，诠释正义，社会想象力，推荐知识相关变量var addthis_config = {ui_cobrand：“泰勒和弗朗西斯在线”，service_compact：“同胞，netvibes，twitter，technorati，delicious，linkedin ，facebook，stumbleupon，digg，google，更多”，发布号：“ ra-4dff56cd6bb1830b”};添加到候选列表链接永久链接http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2010.534568

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