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Philo’s Argument from Evil in Hume’s Dialogues X: A Semantic Interpretation

机译:休ume对话X中的Philo从邪恶的争论:语义解释

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Philo's argument from evil in a much-discussed passage in Part X of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) has been interpreted in three main ways: as a logical argument from evil, as an evidential argument from evil, and as an argument against natural theology's inference of a benevolent and merciful God from the course of the world. I argue that Philo is not offering an argument of any of these sorts, but is arguing that there is a radical disanalogy between the meanings of terms like ‘merciful’ and ‘benevolent’ when applied to God and human beings respectively. Drawing on the new ‘Irreligious Interpretation’ of Hume's philosophy developed by Paul Russell (2002, 2008), I suggest that the underlying aim of Philo's argument appears to be to show, in opposition to Christian teaching, that these terms, when applied to God, are in effect meaningless.
机译:在休ume的《关于自然宗教的对话》(1779年)的第十部分中,费洛关于邪恶的论点被广泛讨论,其解释方式主要有三种:作为邪恶的逻辑论证,作为邪恶的证据论证以及反对自然的论证。神学从世界的道路上推断出仁慈仁慈的上帝。我认为,菲罗(Filo)没有提供任何这类论据,而是在论及“仁慈”和“仁慈”等术语的含义分别适用于上帝和人类时存在根本分歧。借鉴保罗·罗素(Paul Russell,2002,2008)对休ume哲学的新的“非宗教解释”,我认为,菲洛论证的根本目的似乎是表明,与基督教教义相反,这些术语在应用于上帝时,实际上是没有意义的。

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