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Contents of Experience

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In this paper I aim to situate the Naiyayika theory of perception in contemporary philosophy of mind. Following the ancients, I suggest we reconsider the taxonomy and the assumed interactions between kinds of perceptual content. This reclassification will lead us to reconsider some aspects of the Cartesian conception of mind that continue to influence the work of contemporary theorists. I focus attention on different accounts of sensory perception favoured by ancient Indian Naiyayika philosophers and Descartes as a starting point for reconsidering contemporary accounts of perceptual content.I show that Descartes' account of sensory perception provides the impetus for a causal-explanatory account of conceptual content in terms of its non-conceptual counterpart. Though contemporary philosophers claim to have cast off their Cartesian heritage, my discussion reveals that some of its tenets continue to influence the work of contemporary philosophers. I offer reasons for rejecting yet another Cartesian influence and recommend that we follow the Nyaya taxonomy of perceptual states.
机译:本文旨在将奈耶耶卡的知觉理论置于当代心智哲学中。跟随古人,我建议我们重新考虑分类法和各种感知内容之间的假定相互作用。这种重新分类将使我们重新考虑笛卡尔思想观念的某些方面,这些方面继续影响当代理论家的工作。我将注意力集中在古代印度人奈耶依卡(Naiyayika)哲学家和笛卡尔(Descartes)所偏爱的感觉描述的不同方面,以此作为重新考虑当代知觉内容的起点。我表明笛卡尔对感觉内容的描述为概念内容的因果解释提供了动力就其非概念对应而言。尽管当代哲学家声称摆脱了笛卡尔的遗产,但我的讨论表明,它的某些宗旨继续影响着当代哲学家的工作。我提供了拒绝另一种笛卡尔影响的理由,并建议我们遵循感性国家的Nyaya分类法。

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