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首页> 外文期刊>Southern Economic Journal >Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade
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Insecure Resources, Bilateral Trade, and Endogenous Predation: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Conflict and Trade

机译：不安全的资源，双边贸易和内源性捕食：冲突与贸易的游戏学分析

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This article analyzes how interstate conflict over resources affects the incentives to trade and how greater trade openness affects the endogenous decisions of arming by enemy countries. We identify conditions under which there is trade between two adversary countries and show that each adversary's arming affects domestic welfare in three different ways. The first is an export‐revenue effect, which increases welfare because arming causes export revenue to go up (i.e., there is an arming‐induced terms‐of‐trade improvement). The second is a resource‐predation effect, which increases welfare because arming increases the appropriation of a rival country's resource input to produce a consumption good. The third is an output‐distortion effect, which reduces welfare because arming lowers the domestic production of civilian goods. Based on these effects, we show circumstances in which greater trade openness reduces the intensity of arming. We also discuss the implications of resource security asymmetry for conflict and trade.
机译：本文分析了州际州际资源冲突如何影响贸易的激励以及更高的贸易开放影响敌方武装的内生决策。我们确定了两个对手之间有贸易的条件，并表明每个婚前的武装以三种不同的方式影响国内福利。首先是出口 - 收入效应，增加福利，因为武装导致出口收入上升（即，有武装引起的贸易条款改善）。第二个是资源 - 掠夺效果，增加福利，因为武装增加了竞争对手国家资源输入的拨款，以产生消费。第三是输出失真效应，这减少了福利，因为武装降低了国内的民用生产。基于这些效果，我们表明了更大的贸易开放性降低了武装强度的情况。我们还讨论了资源安全不对称对冲突和交易的影响。

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