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首页> 外文期刊>Strategic Management Journal >FIRM-SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE ASSETS AND EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM CEO COMPENSATION DESIGN AND CEO DISMISSAL
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FIRM-SPECIFIC KNOWLEDGE ASSETS AND EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM CEO COMPENSATION DESIGN AND CEO DISMISSAL

机译：公司特定的知识资产和员工安排：CEO薪酬设计和CEO解雇的证据

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Research summary: We argue that firms with greater specificity in knowledge structure need to both encourage their CEOs to stay so that they make investments with a long-term perspective, and provide job securities to the CEOs so that they are less concerned about the risk of being dismissed. Accordingly, we found empirical evidence that specificity in firm knowledge assets is positively associated with the use of restricted stocks in CEO compensation design (indicating the effort of CEO retention) and negatively associated with CEO dismissal (indicating the job securities the firm committed to CEOs). Furthermore, firm diversification was found to mitigate the effect of firm-specific knowledge on both CEO compensation design and CEO dismissal, as CEOs are more removed from the deployment of knowledge resources in diversified firms.
机译：研究摘要：我们认为，知识结构上更具特殊性的公司既需要鼓励其CEO留下来，以便他们具有长远的眼光进行投资，又要向这些CEO提供工作保证，以使他们减少对经营风险的担忧。被解雇。因此，我们发现了经验证据，表明企业知识资产的特殊性与CEO薪酬设计中使用限制性股票有正相关关系（表明CEO留任的努力），而与CEO辞退负相关（表明公司向CEO承诺的工作证券） 。此外，发现公司多元化可以减轻公司专有知识对CEO薪酬设计和CEO辞退的影响，因为在多元化公司中，CEO被更多地从知识资源的部署中撤离了。

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