• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Strategic Management Journal >Corporate divestitures and family control
【24h】

Corporate divestitures and family control

机译：公司资产剥离和家族控制

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This paper investigates the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Using hand-collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm-year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than non-family firms to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non-family-CEOs. However, we then establish that the divestitures undertaken by family firms, predominantly those run by family-CEOs, are associated with higher post-divestiture performance than their non-family counterparts. These findings indicate that family firms may fail to fully exploit available economic opportunities, potentially because they pursue multiple objectives beyond the maximization of shareholder value. These results also elucidate how the characteristics of corporate owners and managers can influence the value that firms derive from their corporate strategies. Copyright (c) 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
机译：本文研究了家族企业资产剥离与企业价值之间的关系。使用从30,000多家公司年观察中抽样收集的数据，我们发现家族企业比非家族企业进行资产剥离的可能性更低，尤其是当这些公司由家族而非非家族CEO管理时。但是，我们然后确定，家族企业进行的资产剥离（主要是家族首席执行官的资产剥离）与非家族资产剥离后的剥离绩效相关。这些发现表明，家族企业可能无法充分利用可利用的经济机会，这可能是因为它们追求的目标超越了股东价值的最大化。这些结果还阐明了公司所有者和经理的特征如何影响公司从其公司战略中获得的价值。版权所有（c）2014 John Wiley＆Sons，Ltd.

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号