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The value of epistemic disagreement in scientific practice. The case of Homo floresiensis

机译:认知分歧在科学实践中的价值。弗洛雷斯人案

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Epistemic peer disagreement raises interesting questions, both in epistemology and in philosophy of science. When is it reasonable to defer to the opinion of others, and when should we hold fast to our original beliefs? What can we learn from the fact that an epistemic peer disagrees with us? A question that has received relatively little attention in these debates is the value of epistemic peer disagreement-can it help us to further epistemic goals, and, if so, how? We investigate this through a recent case in paleoan-thropology: the debate on the taxonomic status of Homo floresiensis remains unresolved, with some authors arguing the fossils represent a novel hominin species, and others claiming that they are Homo sapiens with congenital growth disorders. Our examination of this case in the recent history of science provides insights into the value of peer disagreement, indicating that it is especially valuable if one does not straightaway defer to a peer's conclusions, but nevertheless remains open to a peer's evidence and arguments.
机译:认识论同行的分歧在认识论和科学哲学方面都提出了有趣的问题。什么时候应该服从别人的意见,什么时候我们应该坚持我们最初的信念?从认知同伴不同意的事实中,我们可以学到什么?在这些辩论中,很少引起关注的一个问题是认知同伴分歧的价值-它可以帮助我们进一步实现认知目标吗?我们通过一个古人类学的最新案例对此进行了调查:关于弗洛雷斯人种的生物分类地位的争论仍未解决,一些作者认为这些化石代表一种新颖的人种,而其他人则声称它们是患有先天性生长障碍的智人。我们在最近的科学史中对这一案例的研究提供了对同龄人分歧价值的见解,表明如果不直截了当地遵循同龄人的结论,但是仍然可以接受同龄人的证据和论点,这一点特别有价值。

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