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For the sustainable performance of the carbon reduction labeling policies under an evolutionary game simulation

机译：为了在可持续发展的博弈模拟下可持续实施减碳标签政策

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摘要

The study proposes an evolutionary game model to investigate the possible, responses of enterprises to incentive policies related to the implementation of a carbon reduction labeling scheme, such as a direct subsidy and preferential taxation rates. System dynamics is applied to simulate the created game model and we analyze two scenarios, namely the individual and combined intervention of incentive policies. A case study of China's air conditioner enterprises is then examined, with the simulation results highlighting that both a direct subsidy and preferential taxation positively influence the implementation of the carbon reduction labeling scheme. In particular, the combination of these two incentive policies is efficient compared with individual policy making. Finally, the limitations of the game theoretical analysis are discussed and future research directions are provided. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：该研究提出了一种演化博弈模型，以研究企业对与实施碳减排标签计划有关的激励政策（例如直接补贴和优惠税率）的可能反应。系统动力学被用于模拟所创建的博弈模型，并且我们分析了两种情况，即激励政策的个体干预和联合干预。然后，以中国空调企业为例，仿真结果表明，直接补贴和税收优惠都对减碳标签计划的实施产生积极影响。与单独制定政策相比，这两种激励政策的结合尤其有效。最后，讨论了博弈论分析的局限性，并提供了未来的研究方向。 （C）2016 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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