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Belief formation in a signaling game without common prior: an experiment

机译：没有共同先验的信号游戏中的信念形成：一项实验

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摘要

Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the process of belief formation and evolution in a signaling game in which a common prior is not induced. Both prior and posterior beliefs of Receivers about Senders’ types are elicited, as well as beliefs of Senders about Receivers’ strategies. In the experiment, subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of observations. However, the speed of updating is influenced by the strength of initial beliefs. An interesting result is that beliefs about the prior distribution of types are updated slower than posterior beliefs, which incorporate Senders’ strategies. In the medium run, for some specifications of game parameters, this leads to outcomes being significantly different from the outcomes of the game in which a common prior is induced. It is also shown that elicitation of beliefs does not considerably change the pattern of play in this game.
机译：利用信念启发，本文研究了在不诱导共同先验的信号游戏中信念形成和进化的过程。引起了接收者对发送者类型的先前和后继信念，以及对发送者关于接收者策略的信念。在实验中，受试者通常从分散的统一信念开始，然后根据观察结果对其进行更新。但是，更新速度受初始信念强度的影响。一个有趣的结果是，关于先验类型分布的信念的更新速度比后继信念慢，后者结合了发件人的策略。在中期，对于某些游戏参数规范，这导致结果与引起共同先验的游戏结果显着不同。还显示出信念的激发并不会在很大程度上改变这种游戏的游戏方式。

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