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Leadership and the effective choice of information regime

机译：领导力和信息体制的有效选择

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Economic research suggests that, in some circumstances, exogenously restricting the information leaders can provide to followers can overcome the free-riding problem and coordination failures, and improve efficiency in collective actions. The reason is that a leader's information advantage can deprive followers of the information necessary for profitable defection. In this paper, we focus on situations where the decision to restrict access to information is an endogenous choice made by the leader. We experimentally investigate if leaders choose to strategically withhold information when appropriate to improve outcomes. To address this question, we adopt a single-shot collective action game in which a leader-follower setting with information advantage for the leader can potentially solve the free-riding problem and coordination failures. Our results suggest that leaders, in many circumstances, fail to utilize their information advantage to improve efficiency. This implies that groups may benefit if a nontransparent information regime is exogenously imposed on them.
机译：经济研究表明，在某些情况下，限制领导者可以提供给跟随者的信息可以克服搭便车问题和协调失败，并提高集体行动的效率。原因是领导者的信息优势会剥夺跟随者获得有利可图的叛逃所必需的信息。在本文中，我们重点关注限制访问信息的决策是领导者做出的内生选择的情况。我们通过实验调查领导者是否选择在适当的时候战略性地隐瞒信息以改善结果。为了解决这个问题，我们采用了单发集体行动游戏，其中具有领导者信息优势的领导者跟随者设置可以潜在地解决搭便车问题和协调失败。我们的结果表明，领导者在许多情况下都无法利用其信息优势来提高效率。这意味着，如果将外在的信息制度强加给他们，则群体可能会受益。

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