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首页> 外文期刊>Theory and Decision >Institutions matter! Why the Herder Problem is not a Prisoner's Dilemma
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Institutions matter! Why the Herder Problem is not a Prisoner's Dilemma

机译：制度很重要！为什么牧民问题不是囚徒困境

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摘要

In the game theory literature, Garrett Hardin's famous allegory of the "tragedy of the commons" has been modeled as a variant of the Prisoner's Dilemma, labeled the Herder Problem (or, sometimes, the Commons Dilemma). This brief paper argues that important differences in the institutional structures of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma and Herder Problem render the two games different in kind. Specifically, institutional impediments to communication and cooperation that ensure a dominant strategy of defection in the classic Prisoner's Dilemma are absent in the Herder Problem. Their absence does not ensure that players will achieve a welfare-enhancing, cooperative solution to the Herders Problem, but does create far more opportunity for players to alter the expected payoffs through cooperative arrangements. In a properly modeled Herder Problem-along the lines of an assurance game-defection would not always be the dominant strategy. Consequently, the Herder Problem is not in the nature of a Prisoner's Dilemma.
机译：在博弈论文献中，加勒特·哈丁（Garrett Hardin）关于“公地悲剧”的著名寓言已被建模为囚徒困境的变体，被标记为牧民问题（或有时称为公地困境）。这篇简短的论文认为，标准囚徒困境和牧民问题的制度结构上的重要差异使这两种博弈在种类上有所不同。具体而言，牧民问题中缺乏确保经典囚徒困境中主要的叛逃策略的沟通与合作的制度障碍。他们的缺席并不能确保参与者获得针对牧民问题的增进福利的合作解决方案，但确实为参与者通过合作安排改变预期收益创造了更多的机会。在一个正确建模的“牧民问题”中，保证博弈背叛的路线并非总是占主导地位的策略。因此，牧民问题不是囚徒困境的本质。

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