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首页> 外文期刊>Theory and Decision >DOES TRUST MATTER FOR R&D COOPERATION? A GAME THEORETIC EXAMINATION
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DOES TRUST MATTER FOR R&D COOPERATION? A GAME THEORETIC EXAMINATION

机译：研发合作是否重要？游戏理论考试

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摘要

The game theoretical approach to R&D cooperation does not investigate the role of trust in the initiation and success of R&D cooperation: it either assumes that firms are non-opportunists or that the R&D cooperation is supported by an incentive mechanism that eliminates opportunism. In contrast, the present paper focuses on these issues by introducing incomplete information and two types of firms: opportunist and non-opportunist. Defining trust as the belief of each firm that its potential collaborator will respect the contract, it identifies the trust conditions under which firms initiate R&D alliances and contribute to their success. The higher the spillovers, the higher the level of trust required to initiate R&D cooperation for non-opportunists, while the inverse holds for opportunists.
机译：R＆D合作的博弈论方法并未研究信任在R＆D合作的启动和成功中的作用：它要么假设企业是非机会主义者，要么假设R＆D合作由消除机会主义的激励机制支持。相反，本文通过引入不完整的信息和两种类型的公司（机会主义和非机会主义）来关注这些问题。将信任定义为每家公司相信其潜在合作者将遵守合同的信念，它确定了公司启动R＆D联盟并为其成功做出贡献的信任条件。溢出程度越高，启动非机会主义者的研发合作所需的信任度就越高，而机会主义者则相反。

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