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首页> 外文期刊>Theory and Decision >Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability
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Reining in excessive risk-taking by executives: the effect of accountability

机译：抑制高管过度冒险：问责制的效果

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摘要

Performance-contingent compensation by means of stock options may induce risk-taking in agents that is excessive from the point of view of the company or the shareholders. We test whether increasing shareholder control may be an effective checking mechanism to rein in such excessive risk-taking. We thus tell one group of experimental CEOs that they may have to justify their decision-making processes in front of their shareholders. This indeed reduces risk-taking and increases the performance of the companies they manage. Implications are discussed.
机译：从公司或股东的角度来看，通过股票期权进行的基于绩效的薪酬可能会导致代理商承担过多的风险。我们测试了增加股东控制权是否可能成为抑制这种过度冒险的有效检查机制。因此，我们告诉一组实验性CEO，他们可能必须在股东面前证明其决策过程合理。这确实减少了冒险，并提高了所管理公司的绩效。讨论了含义。

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