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A game of two cities: A toll setting game with experimental results

机译：两个城市的游戏：具有实验结果的收费游戏

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In this paper we model the competition between two cities as a game to maximise the welfare considering the impact of demand management strategies in the form of cordon tolls. This research builds on earlier work which studied the competition in a small tolled network meant for private modes of transport which have a choice of route. The earlier work showed that while both cities have an incentive to charge alone, once they begin, they are likely to fall into the 'Nash Trap' of a prisoner's dilemma where the incentive to defect is higher than that to cooperate thus eventually leading to a 'lose-lose' situation. The current paper extends the idea of competition between cities by setting up a system dynamic model of two cities which includes modes such as car, bus, train and walking and cycling. This paper innovates by integrating the simulation of land use transport interactions with a class room style experimental game and analyses the gaming strategies from a continuous repeated prisoner's dilemma involving setting of tolls to maximise the welfare of residents. The aim is to test (a) whether the strategies adopted are as theory predicts and (b) whether the players recognise the benefits of lower tolls when given information about the regulated solution and collaborate or continue to play to win. The results show that players respond to the information and maintain a collaborative solution which may have significant implications for regulation and the development of cities within regional partnerships.
机译：在本文中，我们考虑了需求管理策略以警戒线通行费的形式，将两个城市之间的竞争建模为一种游戏，以使福利最大化。这项研究建立在早期工作的基础上，该工作研究了小型收费网络中的竞争，该收费网络适用于具有选择路线的私人运输方式。早期的工作表明，尽管两个城市都有单独充电的动机，但一旦开始，它们很可能会陷入囚徒困境的“纳什陷阱”，在这种情况下，背叛的动机高于合作的动机，最终导致“输”的情况。本文通过建立两个城市的系统动力学模型（包括汽车，公共汽车，火车，步行和骑自行车等模式）来扩展城市之间的竞争理念。本文通过将土地利用交通相互作用的模拟与教室风格的实验性游戏相结合进行创新，并从连续不断的囚犯困境中分析了博弈策略，其中包括设定通行费以最大程度地提高居民的福利。目的是测试（a）所采用的策略是否如理论所预测的那样，以及（b）参与者在获得有关受监管解决方案的信息后是否认识到降低通行费的好处，并协作或继续发挥作用来获胜。结果表明，参与者对信息做出反应并保持协作解决方案，这可能对区域合作伙伴关系中城市的监管和发展产生重大影响。

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