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首页> 外文期刊>Water Economics and Policy >The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan
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The Role of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity Among Resource Users on Water Governance: Lessons Learnt from an Economic Field Experiment on Irrigation in Uzbekistan

机译：资源使用者中同质性和异质性在水治理中的作用：从乌兹别克斯坦灌溉经济领域实验中学到的经验教训

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摘要

The governance of common-pool resources, such as irrigation systems, is a highly debated topic in research. Numerous studies suggest that actors can successfully manage these resources through cooperation, especially in hybrid governance structures, if they are able to design and enforce their own rules. Thereby, certain factors, such as the composition of a group of resource users, influence the likelihood of cooperation and the performance of self-managed resource systems. This study employed an economic framed field experiment to compare the effects of externally imposed and self-set rules of water distribution on homogeneous and heterogeneous groups of irrigation users who differ in their economic endowment. The experiment was conducted with 20 farmers in an Uzbek community. Furthermore, questionnaires, group discussions and interviews complemented the analytical method. The results show that groups, homogeneous in their economic endowment are more inclined to comply with self-designed rules than groups that are economically heterogeneous. Thus, homogenous groups achieve a better performance in terms of resource maintenance and water harvest under self-governance. However, water distribution was more equal and the illegal activities decreased in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous groups with self-implemented rules. It was found that trust was a crucial factor regarding both greater individual rule adherence and more cooperative behavior within homogeneous entities compared to heterogeneous groups of irrigation users. Finally, the results support the argument that economic heterogeneity among resource users lowers the likeliness of cooperation in self-governed common-pool resource systems. Institutional economics; common-pool resources; self-governance; heterogeneity; water distribution; Uzbekistan
机译：诸如灌溉系统之类的公共水池资源的治理是研究中一个备受争议的话题。大量研究表明，如果参与者能够设计和执行自己的规则，则他们可以通过合作成功地管理这些资源，尤其是在混合治理结构中。因此，某些因素（例如一组资源用户的组成）会影响合作的可能性和自我管理资源系统的性能。这项研究采用了经济框架实地试验，比较了外部分配和自我设定的水分配规则对经济economic赋不同的同质和异质灌溉用户群体的影响。该实验是在乌兹别克斯坦社区的20位农民进行的。此外，问卷，小组讨论和访谈补充了分析方法。结果表明，与经济上异质的群体相比，经济end赋相同的群体更倾向于遵守自己设计的规则。因此，在自治下，同质群体在资源维护和集水方面取得了更好的表现。但是，在具有自律规则的同质和异质群体中，水的分配更加平等，非法活动有所减少。研究发现，与异质灌溉用户群体相比，信任是同质实体中更大的个人规则遵守和更合作行为的关键因素。最后，结果支持这样一个论点，即资源用户之间的经济异质性降低了自治自治公共资源系统中合作的可能性。制度经济学；公共池资源；自治异质性配水；乌兹别克斯坦

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  • 来源
    《Water Economics and Policy》 |2018年第3期|1850008.1-1850008.30|共30页
  • 作者

    Robert Roβner; Dimitrios Zikos;

  • 作者单位

    Hochschule fuer Technik und Wirtschaft Berlin, Germany;

    IRI-THESys/Division of Resource Economics Humboldt Universitaet zu Berlin, Germany;

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