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The Politics of Constitutional Veto in France: Constitutional Council, Legislative Majority and Electoral Competition

机译:法国的宪法否决权政治:宪法委员会,立法多数和选举竞争

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摘要

This article examines the development of constitutional politics under the Fifth Republic. In particular, it investigates the logics underlying constitutional vetoes. It shows that data for the French case do not support existing theories of veto politics. Therefore, the article develops an electoral theory of veto politics. It emphasises the fact that the incentives generated by electoral competition shape the signalling game between legislative majority, legislative minority and the Constitutional Council. The structure of this game fuels a high level of vetoes and explains the pattern of vetoing in France.
机译:本文考察了第五共和国下宪政的发展。特别是,它研究了构成否决权的逻辑基础。它表明法国案件的数据不支持否决政治的现有理论。因此,本文提出了否决政治的选举理论。它强调了一个事实,即选举竞争产生的激励因素构成了立法多数,立法少数与宪法委员会之间的信号博弈。此游戏的结构使否决权高涨,并解释了法国的否决权模式。

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