...
  • 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>Wireless Networks >Game based incentive mechanism for cooperative spectrum sensing with mobile crowd sensors
【24h】

Game based incentive mechanism for cooperative spectrum sensing with mobile crowd sensors

机译：基于游戏的激励机制与移动人群传感器进行协作频谱感知

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

Mobile crowd sensing emerges as a new paradigm where widespread personal sensors can help to collect information beyond the previously possible scale. Existing spectrum sensing papers consider only secondary users in a cognitive system as the cooperative nodes. While if there are not enough secondary users exist, the cooperative detection performance will be degraded,and which will incur to a low spectrum efficiency or an inevitable interference to primary users. Hence in this paper, we take advantage of the Mobile Crowd Sensing to study the cooperative spectrum sensing where the sensing users are not only the secondary users but also a crowd of mobile users equipped with personal spectrum sensors (such as smartphones, vehicle sensors and tablets). Since spectrum sensing will incur costs for sensing users, an incentive mechanism is necessary to motivate adequate participation. In this paper, a Stackelberg game based incentive mechanism is proposed where the fusion center is leader and mobile sensing users are followers. In Leader game, the fusion center provides an optimal reward to incentive sensing users. And in Follower game, mobile sensing users adjust their own detection probabilities for obtaining more profits when given the reward published by the fusion center. Furthermore, the strategy adjusting process for each sensing user is modeled as a Coalition game where sensing users decide whether join in a coalition based on its utility maximization. We prove the existence of unique Nash Equilibrium in both Follower game and Leader game. Extensive simulations evaluate the feasibility and practically of proposed incentive mechanism. And the results show that a better detection performance can be obtained by the fusion center in our algorithm.
机译：移动人群感应已成为一种新的范例，广泛的个人传感器可以帮助收集超出以前可能的范围的信息。现有的频谱传感论文仅将认知系统中的二级用户视为协作节点。如果没有足够的次要用户，则协作检测性能将下降，从而导致频谱效率低下或不可避免地对主要用户产生干扰。因此，在本文中，我们利用移动人群感应技术来研究协作频谱感应，其中感应用户不仅是次要用户，而且是配备个人频谱传感器（例如智能手机，车辆传感器和平板电脑）的大量移动用户）。由于频谱感测将招致感测用户的费用，因此必须有一种激励机制来激发足够的参与。本文提出了一种基于Stackelberg博弈的激励机制，融合中心为领导者，移动感知用户为跟随者。在领导者游戏中，融合中心向激励感测用户提供最佳奖励。在追随者游戏中，移动感知用户会调整自己的检测概率，以便在获得融合中心发布的奖励后获得更多利润。此外，将每个感测用户的策略调整过程建模为联盟游戏，在该游戏中，感测用户根据其效用最大化来决定是否加入联盟。我们证明在追随者游戏和领导者游戏中都存在唯一的纳什均衡。大量的仿真评估了所提出的激励机制的可行性和实用性。结果表明，融合中心在我们的算法中可以获得更好的检测性能。

著录项

  • 来源
    《Wireless Networks》 |2019年第4期|1855-1866|共12页
  • 作者

    Li Xiaohui; Zhu Qi;

  • 作者单位

    Nanjing Univ Posts & Telecommun, Key Wireless Lab Jiangsu Prov, Sch Telecommun & Informat Engn, Nanjing 210003, Jiangsu, Peoples R China;

    Nanjing Univ Posts & Telecommun, Key Wireless Lab Jiangsu Prov, Sch Telecommun & Informat Engn, Nanjing 210003, Jiangsu, Peoples R China;

  • 收录信息
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

    Incentive mechanism; Spectrum sensing; Mobile crowd sensing; Game theory;

    机译：激励机制;频谱感知;移动人群感知;博弈论;

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号