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首页> 外文期刊>The Australian and New Zealand journal of psychiatry >Psychiatric diagnoses are not mental processes: Wittgenstein on conceptual confusion.
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Psychiatric diagnoses are not mental processes: Wittgenstein on conceptual confusion.

机译：精神病诊断不是精神过程：维特根斯坦（Wittgenstein）关于概念上的困惑。

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BACKGROUND: Empirical explanation and treatment repeatedly fail for psychiatric diagnoses. Diagnosis is mired in conceptual confusion that is illuminated by Ludwig Wittgenstein's later critique of philosophy (Philosophical Investigations). This paper examines conceptual confusions in the foundation of psychiatric diagnosis from some of Wittgenstein's important critical viewpoints. ARGUMENT: Diagnostic terms are words whose meanings are given by usages not definitions. Diagnoses, by Wittgenstein's analogy with 'games', have various and evolving usages that are connected by family relationships, and no essence or core phenomenon connects them. Their usages will change according to the demands and contexts in which they are employed. Diagnoses, like many psychological terms, such as 'reading' or 'understanding', are concepts that refer not to fixed behavioural or mental states but to complex apprehensions of the relationship of a variety of behavioural phenomena with the world. A diagnosis is a sort of concept that cannot be located in or explained by a mental process. CONCLUSION: A diagnosis is an exercise in language and its usage changes according to the context and the needs it addresses. Diagnoses have important uses but they are irreducibly heterogeneous and cannot be identified with or connected to particular mental processes or even with a unity of phenomena that can be addressed empirically. This makes understandable not only the repeated failure of empirical science to replicate or illuminate genetic, neurophysiologic, psychic or social processes underlying diagnoses but also the emptiness of a succession of explanatory theories and treatment effects that cannot be repeated or stubbornly regress to the mean. Attempts to fix the meanings of diagnoses to allow empirical explanation will and should fail as there is no foundation on which a fixed meaning can be built and it can only be done at the cost of the relevance and usefulness of diagnosis.
机译：背景：根据经验的解释和治疗对于精神病学诊断屡屡失败。路德维希·维特根斯坦（Ludwig Wittgenstein）后来对哲学（哲学研究）的批判阐明了诊断中的概念混乱。本文从维特根斯坦的一些重要批判观点出发，考察了精神病诊断基础上的概念混乱。参数：诊断术语是含义由用法而不是定义给出的词。通过维特根斯坦（Wittgenstein）对“游戏”的类比，诊断具有各种不断发展的用法，这些用法通过家庭关系联系在一起，并且没有本质或核心现象将它们联系起来。它们的用法将根据使用它们的需求和上下文而变化。诊断像许多心理学术语（例如“阅读”或“理解”）一样，不是指固定的行为或精神​​状态，而是指对各种行为现象与世界之间关系的复杂理解。诊断是无法在心理过程中找到或解释的一种概念。结论：诊断是一种语言练习，其用法会根据上下文和解决的需求而变化。诊断具有重要的用途，但是它们具有不可减少的异质性，无法与特定的心理过程或什至可以凭经验解决的统一现象相鉴别或联系在一起。这不仅可以理解的是，经验科学的反复失败未能复制或阐明诊断所依据的遗传，神经生理，心理或社会过程，而且使得无法重复或顽固地回归到平均值的一系列解释性理论和治疗效果变得空洞。试图固定诊断的含义以进行经验解释的尝试将会并且应该失败，因为没有可以建立固定含义的基础，并且只能以诊断的相关性和有用性为代价来进行。

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