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首页> 外文期刊>The Journal of grey system >Evolutionary Game Analysis on Solvable Mass Unexpected Incident
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Evolutionary Game Analysis on Solvable Mass Unexpected Incident

机译：可解决的大规模突发事件的演化博弈分析

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摘要

Based on one kind of solvable mass unexpected incident, considering grey information [1,2] and bounded rationality of players, an evolution model of grey games was proposed. A grey payoff matrix between "crisis event" and "crisis manager" was constructed. It explored the evolutionary equilibrium and stability of both sides of game players The evolutionary tendency by using evolution stable strategy was described, Countermeasures and suggestion to avoid the mass unexpected incident converting to social crisis are given, on which how to limit and restrict the benefits of both conflict sides by different strategies is the key to determining the suitable game strategies adopted.
机译：基于一种可解决的大规模突发事件，结合灰色信息[1,2]和玩家的有限理性，提出了灰色游戏的演化模型。构建了“危机事件”和“危机管理者”之间的灰色收益矩阵。探讨了游戏双方的进化均衡与稳定性。描述了利用进化稳定策略的进化趋势，提出了避免大规模突发事件转变为社会危机的对策与建议，并以此为例来限制和限制利益的产生。双方采用不同策略的冲突是确定采用适当博弈策略的关键。

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