• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System
【24h】

Learning and Coordination in the Presidential Primary System

机译：总统初等制度中的学习与协调

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
           
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In elections with three or more candidates, coordination among like-minded voters is an important problem. We analyse the trade-off between coordination and learning about candidate quality under different temporal election systems in the context of the U.S. presidential primary system. In our model, candidates with different policy positions and qualities compete for the nomination, and voters are uncertain about the candidates' valence. This setup generates two effects: vote splitting (i.e. several candidates in the same policy position compete for the same voter pool) and voter learning (as the results in earlier elections help voters to update their beliefs on candidate quality). Sequential voting minimizes vote splitting in late districts, but voters may coordinate on a low-quality candidate. Using the parameter estimates obtained from all the Democratic and Republican presidential primaries during 2000-12, we conduct policy experiments such as replacing the current system with a simultaneous system, adopting the reform proposal of the National Association of Secretaries of State, or imposing party rules that lead to candidate withdrawal when prespecified conditions are met.
机译：在有三名或三名以上候选人的选举中，志同道合的选民之间的协调是一个重要问题。我们在美国总统初选制度的背景下，分析了在不同的临时选举制度下协调和了解候选人质量之间的权衡取舍。在我们的模型中，具有不同政策立场和素质的候选人竞争提名，而选民对候选人的效价不确定。这种设置产生两种效果：投票分裂（即，处于相同政策位置的多个候选人争夺相同的选民池）和选民学习（因为早期选举的结果有助于选民更新对候选人素质的看法）。顺序投票可以最大程度地减少后期地区的投票分裂，但选民可以协调低质量的候选人。利用从2000-12年间所有民主党和共和党总统初选中获得的参数估计，我们进行了政策实验，例如以同时制取代当前制度，采用美国国务卿协会的改革建议或强加政党规则当满足预定条件时导致候选人退出。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号