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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding
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Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding

机译：限制科斯定理：契约，所有权和搭便车

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摘要

If individuals own the right to take any action that they please, and are free to contract about behaviour, will outcomes be efficient in all situations? That is, does the Coase theorem hold? We study this classic question through the lens of a non-cooperative model of contract negotiations, considering both compulsory and voluntary participation in negotiations. In either case, we find that all consistent equilibria of the contracting game are efficient in the case of two players. But if participation is voluntary, and there are more than two players, there are situations in which all consistent equilibria are inefficient. Specifically, the provision of public goods tends to be inefficiently low due to strategic abstention from contracting. Free-riding on others' agreements can be avoided if individuals do not own all their actions. When actions involve the use of assets, efficient action ownership may correspond to collective rather than individual asset ownership.
机译：如果个人有权采取自己愿意采取的任何行动，并且可以就行为自由地订立契约，那么结果是否在所有情况下都是有效的？也就是说，科斯定理成立吗？我们通过考虑强制性和自愿性参与谈判的非合作性合同谈判模型来研究这个经典问题。在这两种情况下，我们发现在两个玩家的情况下，契约游戏的所有一致均衡都是有效的。但是，如果参与是自愿的，并且参与者超过两个，那么在某些情况下，所有持续的均衡都是无效的。具体而言，由于战略性地放弃签约，公共物品的供应往往效率低下。如果个人没有自己的全部行为，就可以避免搭便车。当行动涉及资产的使用时，有效行动所有权可能对应于集体而不是个人资产所有权。

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