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Robust Implementation in Direct Mechanisms

机译:直接机制中的稳健实施

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A social choice function is robustly implementable if there is a mechanism under which the process of iteratively eliminating strictly dominated messages lead to outcomes that agree with the social choice function for all beliefs at every type profile. In an interdependent-value environment with single-crossing preferences, we identify a contraction property on the preferences which together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism. Strict ex post incentive compatibility and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism, including indirect ones. The contraction property requires that the interdependence is not too high. In a linear signal model, the contraction property is equivalent to an interdependence matrix having all eigenvalues smaller than one.
机译:如果存在一种机制,在这种机制下迭代消除严格支配的消息会导致结果与每种类型档案中的所有信念的社会选择功能相符,那么社会选择功能就可以可靠地实现。在具有单交叉偏好的相互依赖值环境中,我们确定了偏好的收缩特性,它与严格的事后激励相容性足以保证在直接机制中的稳健实施。严格的事后激励相容性和收缩特性对于任何机制(包括间接机制)的稳健实施也必不可少。收缩特性要求相互依赖性不能太高。在线性信号模型中,收缩特性等效于所有特征值均小于1的相互依赖矩阵。

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