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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Identifying Sorting-In Theory
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Identifying Sorting-In Theory

机译：识别排序理论

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摘要

Assortative matching between workers and firms provides evidence of the complementarities or substitutes in production. The presence of complementarities is important for policies that aim to achieve the optimal allocation of resources, e.g. unemployment insurance. We argue that using wage data alone, it is virtually impossible to identify whether assortative matching is positive or negative. Even though we cannot identify the sign of the sorting, we can identify the strength, i.e. the magnitude of the cross-partial and the associated welfare loss. We first show that the wage for a given worker is non-monotonic in the type of his employer. This is due to the fact that in a sorting model, wages reflect the opportunity cost of mismatch. We analytically show that this non-monotonicity prevents standard firm fixed effects to correlate with the true type of the firm. We then propose an alternative procedure that measures the strength of sorting in the presence of search frictions. Knowing the strength of sorting facilitates the measurement of the output loss due to mismatch.
机译：工人和企业之间的分类匹配提供了生产中互补性或替代性的证据。互补性的存在对于旨在实现资源优化分配的政策非常重要，例如：失业保险。我们认为，仅使用工资数据，几乎不可能确定分类匹配是正还是负。即使我们不能确定分类的标志，我们也可以确定强度，即跨部门的规模和相关的福利损失。我们首先证明，给定工人的工资在其雇主类型上是非单调的。这是由于以下事实：在分类模型中，工资反映了错配的机会成本。我们分析表明，这种非单调性阻止了标准的公司固定效应与公司的真实类型相关。然后，我们提出了一种替代方法，该方法可在存在搜索摩擦的情况下测量排序强度。知道分类的强度有助于测量由于失配引起的输出损耗。

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