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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation
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Subjective Performance and the Value of Blind Evaluation

机译：主观表现与盲测的价值

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摘要

The incentive and project selection effects of agent anonymity are investigated in a setting where an evaluator observes a subjective signal of project quality. Although the evaluator cannot commit ex ante to an acceptance criterion, she decides up front between informed review, where the agent's ability is directly observable, or blind review, where it is not. An ideal acceptance criterion balances the goals of incentive provision and project selection. Relative to this, informed review results in an excessively steep equilibrium acceptance policy: the standard applied to low-ability agents is too stringent and the standard applied to high-ability agents is too lenient. Blind review, in which all types face the same standard, often provides better incentives, but it ignores valuable information for selecting projects. The evaluator prefers a policy of blind (respectively informed) review when the ability distribution puts more weight on high (respectively low) types, the agent's pay-off from acceptance is high (respectively low), or the quality signal is precise (respectively imprecise). Applications discussed include the admissibility of character evidence in criminal trials and academic refereeing.
机译：在评估人员观察到项目质量的主观信号的情况下，对代理人匿名的激励和项目选择效果进行了研究。尽管评估者无法事前接受验收标准，但她还是在可以直接观察代理人能力的知情审查与不能直接观察的盲目审查之间做出决定。理想的接受标准可以平衡激励措施提供和项目选择的目标。与此相关，知情的审查会导致过于严格的均衡接受政策：适用于低能药物的标准过于严格，适用于高能药物的标准过于宽松。所有类型都面临相同标准的盲目审查通常会提供更好的激励措施，但会忽略用于选择项目的宝贵信息。当能力分布更加重视高（相应低）类型，代理从接受中获得的收益高（相应低）或质量信号准确（分别不准确）时，评估者倾向于盲目（相应通知）审查策略）。讨论的应用包括在刑事审判和学术裁判中接受品格证据。

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