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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets
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Regulating Exclusion from Financial Markets

机译：规避金融市场

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We study optimal enforcement in credit markets in which the only threat facing a defaulting borrower is restricted access to financial markets.We solve for the optimal level of exclusion,and link it to observed institutional arrangements.Regulation in this environment must accomplish two objectives.First,it must prevent borrowers from defaulting on one bank and transferring their resources to another bank.Second,and less obviously,it must give banks the incentive to make sizeable loans,and to honour their promises of future credit.We establish that the optimal regulation resembles observed laws governing default on debt.Moreover,if debtors have the right to a "fresh start" after bankruptcy then this must be balanced by enforceable provisions against fraudulent conveyance.Our optimal regulation is robust,in that it can be implemented in a way that does not require the regulator to have information about either the borrower or lender.Our results isolate the way in which specific institutions surrounding bankruptcy-namely rules governing asset garnishment and fraudulent conveyances-support loan markets in which borrowers have no collateral.
机译：我们研究了信贷市场中的最佳执法，在这种情况下，违约借款人面临的唯一威胁是限制进入金融市场。我们解决了排除的最佳水平，并将其与观察到的制度安排联系起来。在这种环境下的监管必须实现两个目标。第二，也是不太明显的是，它必须激励银行发放大量贷款，并兑现他们对未来信贷的承诺。而且，如果债务人在破产后有权“重新启动”，则必须通过可强制执行的条款与欺诈性转移相平衡。我们的最佳法规是有力的，因为它可以以某种方式实施不需要监管机构掌握有关借款人或贷方的信息。我们的结果将特定机构的方式隔离开来。有关破产的信息，即管理资产抵押和欺诈性运输工具的规则，支持借款人没有抵押品的贷款市场。

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