首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Environmental Planning and Management >Assessing China's discriminative tax on Clean Development Mechanism projects. Does China's tax have so many functions?
【24h】

Assessing China's discriminative tax on Clean Development Mechanism projects. Does China's tax have so many functions?

机译:评估中国对清洁发展机制项目的歧视性税收。中国的税收有这么多功能吗?

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
       

摘要

In the practice of the Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), many CDM host countries heavily rely on high Global Warming Potential (GWP) Greenhouse Gas (GHG) projects. Among them, China might be unique in that it imposes a discriminative tax on projects dealing with high GWP GHGs. The Chinese government takes 65% of the carbon credits from HFC-23 (trifluoromethane) projects, 30% from N_2O (nitrous oxide) projects, but only 2% from other types of projects. Previous studies have expected that this tax has multiple effects: rent-seeking effect, a deterrent effect on the HFC-23 and N_2O projects, a channeling effect that switches the investment from HFC-23 and N_2O projects to other types of projects, and a market distortion effect. However, with the positive analysis and empirical evidence, the present study shows that this tax only has rent-seeking effect, thus China's discriminative tax has been over read.
机译:在实施《京都议定书》的清洁发展机制(CDM)的过程中,许多CDM所在国严重依赖高全球变暖潜能(GWP)温室气体(GHG)项目。其中,中国可能是独特的,因为它对处理高全球升温潜能值温室气体的项目征收区别对待税。中国政府从HFC-23(三氟甲烷)项目中获得65%的碳信用额,从N_2O(一氧化二氮)项目中获得30%的碳信用额,但仅从其他类型的项目中获得2%的碳信用额。先前的研究预计,这种税收会产生多种影响:寻租作用,对HFC-23和N_2O项目的威慑作用,将投资从HFC-23和N_2O项目转换为其他类型项目的渠道效应,以及市场扭曲效应。然而,通过实证分析和经验证据,本研究表明,这种税收仅具有寻租作用,因此对中国的歧视性税收已被过度解读。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号