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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of international management >The Roles of Subsidiary Boards in Multinational Enterprises
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The Roles of Subsidiary Boards in Multinational Enterprises

机译：子公司董事会在跨国企业中的作用

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In recent years, shareholders, regulators, and academics have become increasingly interested in how multinational enterprises (MNEs) can ensure sound corporate governance throughout all entities within a firm. One important mechanism available to MNEs for improving their global governance is the subsidiary board of directors. However, to date scant academic research has focused on the roles of subsidiary boards and the factors that influence their involvement in different roles. Using survey data from a sample of MNE subsidiaries operating in Belgium with headquarters in 14 different countries, we find that a subsidiary board performs four roles: control, strategy, coordination, and service. Further, a subsidiary board is more involved in control, strategy, and service roles if the subsidiary operates only in the local market, independently from the headquarters (the local implementer subsidiary). In particular, the board of the local implementer subsidiary is more involved in strategy and coordination roles when more directors are headquarters country nationals. Our findings collectively suggest that the subsidiary board facilitates a subsidiary's pursuit of its strategic objective and helps to manage the headquarters subsidiary agency problem. Moreover, subsidiary directors' characteristics influence the subsidiary board's ability to perform its roles. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机译：近年来，股东，监管机构和学者对跨国企业（MNE）如何确保公司中所有实体的健全公司治理越来越感兴趣。跨国公司可用来改善其全球治理的一种重要机制是子公司董事会。但是，迄今为止，很少有学术研究集中在附属董事会的角色以及影响其参与不同角色的因素上。通过使用在比利时运营，总部设在14个不同国家/地区的MNE子公司的样本调查数据，我们发现子公司董事会扮演四个角色：控制，战略，协调和服务。此外，如果子公司董事会仅在本地市场中运营，独立于总部（本地实施者子公司），则子公司董事会将更多地参与控制，策略和服务角色。特别是，当更多的董事是总部所在地的国民时，本地实施者子公司的董事会将更多地参与战略和协调角色。我们的发现共同表明，子公司董事会可以促进子公司实现其战略目标，并有助于管理总部子公司的代理问题。此外，子公司董事的特征影响子公司董事会履行职责的能力。 （C）2015 Elsevier Inc.保留所有权利。

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