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On the design of a credit agreement with peer monitoring

机译：关于具有对等监视功能的信贷协议的设计

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This paper analyses the optimal design of collective credit agreements with joint responsibility. First, we demonstrate that these agreements can potentially induce peer monitoring, reduce the incidence of strategic default, and enhance the lender's ability to elicit debt repayments. The resulting benefits in terms of extended credit should, however, be weighted against the higher monitoring effort that such agreements impose upon participant borrowers. Second, we show that the relative benefits from peer monitoring are maximized when risks are positively correlated across borrowers, and also when the size of the group is neither too small (due to a "joint responsibility", "cost sharing", and "commitment" effects) nor too large (due to a "free riding" effect). Third, we compare among different monitoring structures.
机译：本文分析了具有共同责任的集体信用协议的最优设计。首先，我们证明这些协议可以潜在地引起同伴监视，减少战略违约的发生率并增强贷方的还款能力。但是，应将由此产生的在扩展信贷方面的利益与此类协议强加给参与者借款人的更高的监督努力进行权衡。其次，我们表明，当风险在借款人之间呈正相关时，并且在组的规模也不算太小时（由于“共同责任”，“成本分担”和“承诺”，同伴监控的相对收益将最大化）。效果）也不要太大（由于“搭便车”效果）。第三，我们比较不同的监控结构。

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