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Banking regulation and competition with product differentiation

机译：银行监管和产品差异化竞争

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The main motivation for prudential regulation is to increase the solvency of the banking sector. However, it is usually understood that tighter regulation also leads to more concentration and higher spreads. Thus, these prudential measures are seen as implying a trade-off between solvency and competition. In this paper we argue that this trade-off does not necessarily exist. We present a model in which tighter capital requirements lead banks to choose a lower degree of product differentiation, potentially inducing more intense competition and lower spreads. The model is motivated by the recent evolution of the Argentine banking sector.
机译：审慎监管的主要动机是提高银行业的偿付能力。但是，通常可以理解，更严格的监管也会导致更大的集中度和更高的价差。因此，这些审慎的措施被认为暗示着偿付能力和竞争之间的权衡。在本文中，我们认为这种折衷不一定存在。我们提出了一个模型，在该模型中，更严格的资本要求导致银行选择较低程度的产品差异化，从而可能导致更激烈的竞争和更低的点差。该模型是受阿根廷银行业最近发展的推动。

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