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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Theoretical Biology >Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games.
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Bounded rationality in volunteering public goods games.

机译：在志愿公益活动中具有无限的理性。

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摘要

It is one of the fundamental problems in biology and social sciences how to maintain high levels of cooperation among selfish individuals. Theorists present an effective mechanism promoting cooperation by allowing for voluntary participation in public goods games. But Nash's theory predicts that no one can do better or worse than loners (players unwilling to join the public goods game) in the long run, and that the frequency of participants is independent of loners' payoff. In this paper, we introduce a degree of rationality and investigate the model by means of an approximate best response dynamics. Our research shows that the payoffs of the loners have a significant effect in anonymous voluntary public goods games by this introduction and that the dynamics will drive the system to a fixed point, which is different from the Nash equilibrium. In addition, we also qualitatively explain the existing experimental results.
机译：如何保持自私的个体之间的高水平合作是生物学和社会科学的基本问题之一。理论家提出了一种有效的机制，可以通过允许自愿参与公益游戏来促进合作。但是纳什的理论预测，从长远来看，没有人能比孤独者（不愿参加公共游戏的玩家）做得更好或更糟，参与者的频率与孤独者的收益无关。在本文中，我们介绍了一定程度的合理性，并通过近似最佳响应动力学研究了该模型。我们的研究表明，通过这种介绍，独行者的收益在匿名的自愿性公共物品博弈中具有显着影响，并且动态性会将系统推向固定点，这与纳什均衡不同。另外，我们也定性地解释了现有的实验结果。

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