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首页> 外文期刊>Cognition: International Journal of Cognitive Psychology >Religious credence is not factual belief
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Religious credence is not factual belief

机译：宗教信仰不是事实信仰

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摘要

I argue that psychology and epistemology should posit distinct cognitive attitudes of religious credence and factual belief, which have different etiologies and different cognitive and behavioral effects. I support this claim by presenting a range of empirical evidence that religious cognitive attitudes tend to lack properties characteristic of factual belief, just as attitudes like hypothesis, fictional imagining, and assumption for the sake of argument generally lack such properties. Furthermore, religious credences have distinctive properties of their own. To summarize: factual beliefs (i) are practical setting independent, (ii) cognitively govern other attitudes, and (iii) are evidentially vulnerable. By way of contrast, religious credences (a) have perceived normative orientation, (b) are susceptible to free elaboration, and (c) are vulnerable to special authority. This theory provides a framework for future research in the epistemology and psychology of religious credence.
机译：我认为心理学和认识论应该对宗教信仰和事实信仰提出不同的认知态度，这些态度具有不同的病因以及不同的认知和行为影响。我通过提出一系列经验证据来支持这一主张，即宗教认知态度往往缺乏事实信仰的特征，就像假设，虚构想象和出于辩论的假设之类的态度通常缺乏这种特征一样。此外，宗教证书具有其自身的独特属性。总结一下：事实信念（i）在实践环境中是独立的，（ii）在认知上支配着其他态度，并且（iii）显然是脆弱的。相比之下，宗教证书（a）已感知规范取向，（b）易于自由阐述，（c）容易受到特殊权威的影响。这一理论为未来的宗教信仰的认识论和心理学研究提供了框架。

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