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Investment and the Policy Process in Conservation Monitoring

机译:保护监测的投资和政策程序

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Despite decades of discussion and implementation, conservation monitoring remains a challenge. Many current solutions in the literature focus on improving the science or making more structured decisions. These insights are important but incomplete in accounting for the politics and economics of the conservation decisions informed by monitoring. Our novel depiction of the monitoring enterprise unifies insights from multiple disciplines (conservation, operations research, economics, and policy) and highlights many underappreciated factors that affect the expected benefits of monitoring. For example, there must be a strong link between the specific needs of decision makers and information gathering. Furthermore, the involvement of stakeholders other than scientists and research managers means that new information may not be interpreted and acted upon as expected. While answering calls for sharply delineated objectives will clearly add focus tomonitoring efforts, for practical reasons, high-level goalsmay purposefully be left vague, to facilitate other necessary steps in the policy process. We use the expanded depiction of the monitoring process to highlight problems of cooperation and conflict. We critique calls to invest in monitoring for the greater good by arguing that incentives are typically lacking. Although the benefits of learning accrued within a project (e.g., improving management) provide incentives for investing in some monitoring, it is unrealistic, in general, to expect managers to add potentially costly measures to generate shared benefits. In the traditional linear model of the role of science in policy decisions, monitoring reduces uncertainty and decision makers are rational, unbiased consumers of the science. However, conservation actions increasingly involve social conflict. Drawing insights from political science, we argue that in high-conflict situations, it is necessary to address the conflict prior to monitoring.
机译:尽管经过数十年的讨论和实施,保护监测仍然是一个挑战。文献中许多当前的解决方案都集中在改进科学或做出更结构化的决策上。这些洞察力很重要,但在解释由监测得出的保护决定的政治和经济学方面是不完整的。我们对监控企业的新颖描述统一了来自多个学科(保护,运筹学,经济学和政策)的见解,并突出了许多影响监控预期收益的未被充分认识的因素。例如,决策者的特定需求和信息收集之间必须存在紧密的联系。此外,除了科学家和研究经理以外,其他利益相关者的参与也意味着新的信息可能无法按预期进行解释和采取行动。虽然回答明确界定的目标的要求将明显增加监视工作的重点,但出于实际原因,可能有目的地使高层目标模糊不清,以促进政策过程中的其他必要步骤。我们使用对监视过程的扩展描述来强调合作与冲突问题。我们批评人们呼吁通常通过缺乏激励措施来投资于监测更大的利益。尽管项目中产生的学习收益(例如,改进管理)为激励某些监测工作提供了动力,但总的来说,期望经理们增加可能产生成本的措施来产生共同收益是不现实的。在科学在政策决策中作用的传统线性模型中,监控减少了不确定性,决策者是理性,公正的科学消费者。但是,保护行动越来越多地涉及社会冲突。我们从政治学中获得见识,我们认为在发生冲突的情况下,有必要在监控之前解决冲突。

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