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首页> 外文期刊>European Journal of Operational Research >Coordination mechanism, risk sharing, and risk aversion in a five-level textile supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty
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Coordination mechanism, risk sharing, and risk aversion in a five-level textile supply chain under demand and supply uncertainty

机译：在需求和供应不确定性下，五层纺织供应链中的协调机制，风险共享和风险厌恶

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摘要

The textile supply chain has attracted worldwide attention because of its high volatility in apparel and cotton production due to coordination issue and yield uncertainty. In this context, existing analytical works related to coordination are restricted to a dyadic apparel retailer-manufacturer setting under demand uncertainty for the conventional manufacturer-led scenario. Several issues, such as the holistic depiction of the textile supply chain, impact of cotton production uncertainty, coordination mechanism for the emerging retailer-led scenario, and profitability issue of cotton firms, have not been paid enough attention. We propose an analytical model for a textile supply chain by adopting a five-level structure that comprises an apparel retailer, apparel manufacturer, textile firm, fiber firm, and cotton firm under simultaneous demand and supply uncertainty using a wholesale price contract. The wholesale price contract fails to coordinate the supply chain. Next, we show how the buyback contract and option contract coordinate this supply chain under manufacturer-led and retailer-led scenarios, respectively. Additionally, we discuss the improvement of cotton firm's profitability using a risk-sharing mechanism between the cotton firm and the fiber firm for the high loss-making scenarios. Also, we demonstrate how the risk-averse attitude of both the apparel retailers and the cotton firms can lead to the unsold cotton inventory problem. As extensions, first, we devise joint pricing and order quantity decision of apparel. Finally, we consider production uncertainties for all middle-level members in our proposed model and devise a buyback bidirectional sales rebate penalty contract for coordination. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
机译：由于协调问题和不确定性，由于其服装和棉花生产的高挥发性，纺织供应链引起了全世界的关注。在这种情况下，与协调有关的现有分析工程仅限于传统制造商主导场景的需求不确定性的二元服装零售商制造商环境。几个问题，如纺织供应链的整体描绘，棉花生产不确定性的影响，新出现的零售商领导情景的协调机制，以及棉花公司的盈利发行，尚未得到足够的注意。我们通过采用五级结构提出了一种纺织供应链的分析模型，该模拟包括服装零售商，服装制造商，纺织公司，纤维公司和棉花公司的同时需求和使用批发价格合同提供不确定性。批发价格合同未能协调供应链。接下来，我们展示了回购合同和期权合同如何分别根据制造商 - LED和零售商LED方案协调这一供应链。此外，我们讨论了棉花公司在棉花公司与纤维公司之间进行高损失方案的风险共享机制来提高棉花公司的盈利能力。此外，我们展示了服装零售商和棉花公司的风险厌恶态度如何导致未售出的棉花库存问题。作为扩展，首先，我们设计了服装的联合定价和订单数量决策。最后，我们考虑在我们提出的模型中为所有中层成员的生产不确定性，并设计回购双向销售折扣罚款协调合同。 （c）2019 Elsevier B.v.保留所有权利。

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