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首页> 外文期刊>Cognition: International Journal of Cognitive Psychology >Mental files theory of mind: When do children consider agents acquainted with different object identities?
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Mental files theory of mind: When do children consider agents acquainted with different object identities?

机译：心理文件的心理理论：孩子何时考虑代理人熟悉不同的对象身份？

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Mental files theory explains why children pass many perspective taking tasks like the false belief test around age 4 (Perner & Leahy, 2016). It also explains why older children struggle to understand that beliefs about an object depend on how one is acquainted with it (intensionality or aspectuality). If Heinz looks at an object that is both a die and an eraser, but cannot tell by looking that it is an eraser, he will not reach for it if he needs an eraser. Four- to 6-year olds find this difficult (Apperly & Robinson, 1998). We tested 129 35- to 86-month olds with a modified version of Apperly and Robinson's task. Each child faced four tasks resulting from two experimental factors, timing and mode of information. Timing: Children saw Heinz learn the die's location either before or after they learn that the die is an eraser. Mode of information: Heinz learns where the die is either perceptually or verbally. When Heinz' learning is verbal, he never perceives the die at all. We found that Apperly and Robinson's problem occurs only in the seen-after condition, where Heinz sees the die afterchildren had learnt that it was also an eraser. It vanishes when Heinz learns where the die is before children learn that it is also an eraser. The problem also vanishes when Heinz learns where the die is purely verbally (e.g., "The die is in the red box") and never sees it. This evidence lets us refine existing mental files theory, and eliminate several alternatives from the literature.
机译：精神档案理论解释了为什么孩子通过许多视角，就像4岁左右的虚假信仰测试一样（Perner和Leahy，2016）。它还解释了为什么年龄较大的孩子们努力理解对象的信念依赖于如何熟悉它（重征或方向性）。如果亨氏看起来是一个模具和橡皮擦的物体，但不能看它是一个橡皮擦，如果他需要橡皮擦，他就不会伸手去拿。四到6岁的人发现这一困难（Apperly＆Robinson，1998）。我们测试了129个35至86个月大的大型，具有修改版的Apperly和Robinson的任务。每个孩子面临来自两个实验因素，时间和信息模式产生的四项任务。时间：儿童看见海因斯在他们了解之前或之后学习死亡的位置，以便在他们学习死亡是橡皮擦之后。信息模式：Heinz了解死亡的感知或口头的位置。当海因斯的学习是口头的时候，他从未认识过死亡。我们发现，竞争力和罗宾逊的问题只发生在后面的状态下，亨氏看到死亡后才知道它也是橡皮擦。当亨氏在学习前的时候都在孩子们之前了解到它也是橡皮擦时，它会消失。当Heinz学习死亡纯粹口头（例如，“死在红色盒子里”）时，这个问题也消失了，而且从未看到它。这证据可以让我们改善现有的精神文件理论，并消除文献中的几个替代品。

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