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Multiparty Evolutionary Game Model in Coal Mine Safety Management and Its Application

机译:煤矿安全管理中的多派进化博弈模型及其应用

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摘要

Coal mine safety management involves many interested parties and there are complex relationships between them. According to game theory, a multiparty evolutionary game model is established to analyze the selection of strategies. Then, a simplified three-party model is taken as an example to carry out detailed analysis and solution. Based on stability theory of dynamics system and phase diagram analysis, this article studies replicator dynamics of the evolutionary model to make an optimization analysis of the behaviors of those interested parties and the adjustment mechanism of safety management policies and decisions. The results show how the charge of supervision of government department and inspection of coal mine enterprise impact the efficiency of safety management and the effect of constraint measures and incentive and other measures in safety management.
机译:煤矿安全管理涉及许多感兴趣的各方,它们之间存在复杂的关系。 根据博弈论,建立了一种多党的进化游戏模型来分析策略的选择。 然后,将简化的三方模型作为示例进行详细分析和解决方案。 基于动力学系统和相图分析的稳定性理论,本文研究了进化模型的复制器动态,对这些感兴趣的各方的行为以及安全管理政策和决策的调整机制进行了优化分析。 结果表明,政府部门监管和煤矿企业检验的程度如何影响安全管理的效率和制约措施和激励措施以及其他安全管理措施。

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  • 来源
    《Complexity》 |2018年第2期|共10页
  • 作者单位

    Shandong Univ Sci &

    Technol Coll Math &

    Syst Sci Qingdao 266590 Peoples R China;

    Shandong Univ Sci &

    Technol Coll Econ &

    Management Qingdao 266590 Peoples R China;

    Shandong Univ Sci &

    Technol Coll Econ &

    Management Qingdao 266590 Peoples R China;

    Shandong Univ Sci &

    Technol Coll Econ &

    Management Qingdao 266590 Peoples R China;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 大系统理论;
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