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首页> 外文期刊>Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics >Role of Private Investment in Groundwater Irrigation and Emerging Changes in Seasonal Land Leasing Contract during Boro Rice Cultivation in West Bengal Since 1990s: An Application of Game Theory
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Role of Private Investment in Groundwater Irrigation and Emerging Changes in Seasonal Land Leasing Contract during Boro Rice Cultivation in West Bengal Since 1990s: An Application of Game Theory

机译：20世纪90年代以来，西孟加拉邦博罗水稻种植过程中私人投资对地下水灌溉和新出现变化的作用：博弈论的应用

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Since the early-1990s, with the advent of globalisation in Indian economy, there has been growing demand for agricultural inputs associated with the growing burden of subsidies combined with fiscal constraint. Paradoxically with spread of the new technology there is an increasing dependence on modern inputs in agriculture, while there has been declining public investment in agriculture. The share of public sector in the gross capital formation (GCF) in agriculture which was about 43 per cent in the early 1980s drastically declined to about 15 per cent by 2010-11. The growing capital intensity in agriculture and the relatively declining role of the state in input supply raises serious challenges to agricultural development and especially the welfareof the small and marginal farmers. Despite extreme population pressures and limited land resources, the notable progress of West Bengal in achieving food security can largely be attributed to the enforcement of tenancy reforms and the rapid expansion ofgroundwater irrigation. This policy promoted rapid expansion of irrigated "boro" rice farming in the dry season. As boro cultivation required controlled irrigation it flourished where canal irrigation in the post-monsoon season was adequate. In many areas that were outside the command areas of the governmental irrigation facilities, private farmers invested in groundwater extraction devices. The growth of private water market in the post monsoon season led to reverse tenancy, i.e., leasing out of land from relatively smaller to relatively large farmers. The study forms a game theoretical model based on the data collected from surveys conducted in some village households of Murshidabad district. The findings suggest that both the small and the large farmers gain from this seasonal leasing contract, without the fear of losing the existing Barga rights.
机译：自20世纪90年代初期以来，随着印度经济全球化的出现，与越来越多的补贴负担与财政限制相结合的农业投入的需求越来越大。矛盾的新技术传播越来越依赖农业现代投入，而农业公共投资则降低。 20世纪80年代初的农业总体资本形成（GCF）中的公共部门份额大约是43％，截至2010年至11月，大幅下降至约15％。农业中不断增长的资本强度和州投入供应中的州的相对萎缩对农业发展产生了严峻挑战，特别是小型和边际农民的福利。尽管人口压力和有限的土地资源，西孟加拉邦在实现粮食安全方面的显着进展可能主要归因于租赁改革的执行和地图水灌溉的快速扩张。该政策促进了干旱季节灌溉“Boro”稻田的快速扩张。由于博罗栽培所需的控制灌溉它蓬勃发展，季风季节运河灌溉充足。在政府灌溉设施的命令领域以外的许多领域，投资地下水提取装置的私人农民。季风季节的私营水量市场的增长导致了反向租赁，即，从相对较小的农民中释放出来的土地。该研究形成了一种基于在Murshidabad区的一些村庄家庭中进行的调查中收集的数据的游戏理论模型。调查结果表明，小型和大型农民都从这个季节性租赁合同中获得，而不会担心失去现有的扶手权。

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