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首页> 外文期刊>International journal of applied mechanics >Optimizing Risk Allocation in Public-Private Partnership Projects by Project Finance Contracts. The Case of Put-or-Pay Contract for Stranded Posidonia Disposal in the Municipality of Bari
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Optimizing Risk Allocation in Public-Private Partnership Projects by Project Finance Contracts. The Case of Put-or-Pay Contract for Stranded Posidonia Disposal in the Municipality of Bari

机译：通过项目财务合同优化公私合作项目中的风险分配。 在巴里市政搁浅的Posidonia处置的投放或支付合同的案例

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摘要

This paper investigates the impact of the adoption of public support on the performance of public-private partnership (PPP) projects as perceived and measured by the different actors involved. In particular, the public support investigated by this study is put-or pay contracts, which are often used in PPP projects financed through project finance to optimize risk allocation. In order to quantify the benefit gained by each party with and without the put-or-pay contract, cash flows of the project have been modeled by using the concept of real option, defined as the right without the obligation to make an action if it is convenient to do so. This concept enabled us to model and quantify the inner flexibility mechanism of put-or-pay contracts. With a put-or-pay agreement signed between the municipality, a (private) owner, and operator of a disposal facility, the owner of the facility has the faculty, without any obligation, to require the payment of penalty, if the municipality fails to meet its obligations. This means that the owner of the facility holds a series of European put options that can be exercised if it is convenient for the holder. The developed model has been used for studying the effectiveness of put-or-pay contracts for financing the treatment plant of a special dispose through project finance, i.e., the plant for disposal of marine plant posidonia.
机译：本文调查了公众支持公开支持对公私伙伴关系（PPP）项目的履行的影响，由所涉及的不同行动者鉴定和衡量。特别是，本研究调查的公共支持是投入或支付合同，该合同通常用于通过项目融资资助的PPP项目来优化风险分配。为了量化每方的福利，没有薪酬或支付合同，通过使用实际选择的概念来模拟项目的现金流量，定义为权利，无需制定行动方便这样做。该概念使我们能够模拟并量化推杆合同的内部灵活性机制。通过在市政，（私人）所有者和处置设施的运营商之间签署的投放或支付协议，该设施的所有者在没有任何义务的情况下拥有教师，要求支付刑罚，如果市政府失败履行其义务。这意味着该设施的所有者可以持有一系列欧洲换档选项，如果它对持有人方便，可以行使。开发的模型已被用于研究通过项目融资，即处理海洋植物Posidonia的特殊处置治疗厂的投资或支付合同的有效性。

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