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Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour market:Firms'Strategies for Recruitment and Retention

机译:摩擦劳动力市场的工资任期合同:公司招聘和保留的公司

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摘要

A common assumption in equilibrium search and matching models of the labour market is that each firm posts a wage,to be paid to any worker hired.This paper considers the implications of firms posting contracts,in a random matching model with on-the-job search.More complex contracts enable firms to address both recruitment and retention problems by,for example,increasing the wage with tenure.The effect on tehe labour maket is to reduce turnover,below the level required for efficient matching of workers to firms.
机译:劳动力市场的均衡搜索和匹配模型的共同假设是每个公司的工资,将支付给任何雇佣的工人。本文认为公司邮寄合同的影响,在随机匹配模型中与在职作用 Search.More Complex合同使公司能够通过增加工资的工资来解决招聘和保留问题。对Tehe劳动力的影响是减少营业额,低于工人对企业有效匹配所需的水平。

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