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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes
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Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes

机译：保护合同和政治制度

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This article provides a flexible model of resource extraction, such as deforestation, and derives the optimal conservation contract. When property rights are "strong" and districts are in charge of extracting their own resources to get revenues, conservation in one district benefits the others since the reduced supply raises the sales price. A central authority would internalize this positive externality and thus conserve more. When property rights are instead weak and extraction is illegal or costly control, conservation in one district increases the price and thus the profit from illegally depleting the resource in the other districts. The externality from conservation is then negative, and centralization would lead to less conservation. We also derive the optimal conservation contract, and we explain when the principal, who values conservation, benefits from contracting with the districts directly even when contracting with a central authority would have led to more conservation, and vice versa.
机译：本文提供了灵活的资源提取模型，例如森林砍伐，并源于最佳保护合同。当产权为“强烈”和地区负责提取自己的资源获取收入时，自从供应减少提高销售价格以来，在一个地区的保护中受益。中央权威将使这种正外部性内化，从而保护更多。当产权疲弱和提取是非法或昂贵的控制时，一个地区的保护增加了价格，从而非法消除了其他地区资源的利润。从保护的外部性是消极的，集中化会导致更少的保护。我们还获得了最佳的保护合同，我们解释了校长，谁甚至在与中央政府签约中直接与地区直接与地区承包的校长会导致更多的保护，反之亦然。

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