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Manipulated Electorates and Information Aggregation

机译:操纵选民和信息聚集

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We study the aggregation of dispersed information in elections in which turnout may depend on the state.State-dependent turnout may arise from the actions of a biased and informed”election organizer".Voters are symmetric ex ante and prefer policy a in state α and policy b in state β,but the organizer prefers policy a regardless of the state.Each recruited voter observes a private signal about the unknown state but does not leam the turnout.First,we characterize how the outcomes of large elections depend on the turnout pattern across states.In contrast to existing results for large elections,there are equilibria in which information aggregation fails whenever there is an asymmetry in turnout;information aggregation is only guaranteed in all equilibria if turnout is state independent.Second,when the turnout is the result of costly voter recruitment by a biased organizer,the organizer can ensure that its favourite policy a is implemented with high probability independent of the state as the voter recruitment cost vanishes.Moreover,information aggregation will fail in all equilibria.The critical observation is that a vote is more likely to be pivotal for the decision if turnout is smaller,leading to a systematic bias of the decision toward the low-turnout state.
机译:我们研究选举中分散信息的聚合,其中投票率可能取决于状态。依赖于偏见和通知的“选举组织者”的动作可能出现依赖的润路件。在状态α和更喜欢策略A中的偏见和通知的“选举组织者”.Voters inα和较好策略B在州β,但是组织者更倾向于策略a,无论国家如何,招聘选民观察关于未知州的私人信号,但没有比赛。首先,我们描绘了大选举的结果如何取决于投票率横跨州。与大型选举的现有结果对比,每当出额率的不对称时,有均衡的信息聚集失败;如果润盘突出是独立的,则只能保证信息聚合。如果转盘是结果由偏见的组织者招募的昂贵的选民招募,组织者可以确保其最喜欢的策略A以高概率实现,而与T他选民招聘成本消失。更多over,信息聚集在所有均衡中都会失败。如果投票率较小,则批判性观察是对决定的决定更有可能成为关键,导致对低投票的决定进行系统偏见状态。

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