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首页> 外文期刊>The Review of Economic Studies >Rank Effects in Bargaining:Evidence from Government Formation
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Rank Effects in Bargaining:Evidence from Government Formation

机译：讨价还价的秩效应：政府形成的证据

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摘要

Theories of multilateral bargaining and coalition formation applied to legislatures predict that parties’seat shares determine their bargaining power.We present findings that are difficult to reconcile with this prediction,but consistent with a norm prescribing that”the most voted party should form the government".We first present case studies from several countries and regression discontinuity design-based evidence from twenty-eight national European parliaments.We then focus on 2,898 Spanish municipal elections in which two parties tie in the number of seats.We find that the party with slightly more general election votes is substantially more likely to appoint the mayor.Since tied parties should(on average) have equal bargaining power,this identifies the effect of being labeled the most voted.This effect is comparable to that of obtaining an additional seat,and is also present when a right-wing party is the most voted and the second and third most voted parties are allied left-wing parties who can form a combined majority.A model where elections both aggregate information and discipline incumbents can rationalize our results and yields additional predictions we take to the data,such as voters punishing second most voted parties that appoint mayors.
机译：适用于立法机关的多边谈判和联盟形成的理论预测，缔约方的股份确定了他们的讨价还价。我们难以调和这种预测，但与“最票据应该形成政府”的规范符合规范符合规范。我们的首次来自若干国家和回归不连续的设计的案例研究来自二十八个国家欧洲议会的基于基于的基于的证据。然后，我们专注于2,898个西班牙市选举，其中两党在席位的数量中绑架。我们发现略微的党更普通的选举投票基本上更有可能任命市长.Since捆绑派对应该（平均）有同议价权力，这确定了被标记为最票据的效果。本效果与获得额外座位的效果相当，而且当右翼党最投票时也存在，第二个和第三次投票各方都是左翼可以形成组合的缔约方。在选举综合信息和纪律境外的典型方案可以合理化我们的结果，并产生额外的预测，我们对数据采取的数据，例如惩罚委任市长的第二票最具投票缔约方的选民。

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