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Bargaining Power Choices with Moral Hazard in a Supply Chain

机译：讨价还价的电力选择，供应链中的道德风险

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摘要

A supply chain contract is established using a dynamic, Nash bargaining game which determines the optimal bargaining power allocation for the manufacturer, retailer, and society in an environment affected by moral hazard and irreversible investment. The results found that themanufacturer’s choice was to hold all bargaining power; however, due to the remaining information problem, the retailer still had a profit; in contrast, the retailer was only willing to give up bargaining power if the manufacturer’s profit was reserved.The optimal bargaining power allocation was found to be strongly related to the ability to convert andmonitor technology, with the bargaining power gradually shifting to the manufacturer as the technology improved. A numerical simulation is given to examine the theoretical results.
机译：使用动态纳什议价游戏建立供应链合同，该游戏确定了由道德风险和不可逆转的投资影响的环境中制造商，零售商和社会的最佳讨价还价的电力分配。 结果发现，Themanufacturer的选择是持有所有讨价还价的力量; 但是，由于剩余的信息问题，零售商仍有利润; 相比之下，如果制造商的利润预留，零售商才愿意放弃讨价还价的权力。发现最佳讨价还价的电力分配与转换和监测技术的能力密切相关，讨价还价的功率逐渐转向制造商 技术改进。 给出了数值模拟来检查理论结果。

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