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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Development Economics >Kompromat: A theory of blackmail as a system of governance
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Kompromat: A theory of blackmail as a system of governance

机译：kompromat：作为治理制度的勒索理论

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Kompromat - widespread criminality combined with systematic blackmail - plays an important role in the governance of many non-democratic states. I model this phenomenon. Citizens have a preference for retribution, that is, for inflicting costly punishments on criminals. The state can manipulate this preference for its own benefit by tolerating crime while collecting evidence of crimes to use for blackmail. High levels of crime coexist with large expenditures on police. The rich but not the poor are allowed to commit crimes, increasing inequality. Kompromat regimes appear in states with low fiscal capacity and either very low or very high police capacity. When police capacity is high, investments in fiscal capacity and police capacity can be substitutes. States with initially similar capacities can diverge over time, and states that enter the kompromat regime can become stuck there. The possibility of kompromat qualifies previous claims that evolved retributive preferences increase material welfare.
机译：Kompromat - 广泛的犯罪与系统勒索相结合 - 在许多非民主国家的治理中起着重要作用。我塑造了这种现象。公民偏好报应，即对犯罪分子的昂贵惩罚造成昂贵的惩罚。国家可以通过容忍犯罪来操纵这一偏好，因为收集用于勒索犯罪的证据。高水平的犯罪共存与警方大支出。富人但不是穷人允许犯罪，不平等。 Kompromat政权出现在低财产能力和非常低或非常高的警察能力。当警察能力很高时，财政能力和警察能力的投资可以是替代品。最初类似的能力的各国随着时间的推移可以发散，并且进入Kompromat政权的状态可能会被困在那里。 Kompromat的可能性符合前一份索赔，即进化的预级偏好增加了物质福利。

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