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首页> 外文期刊>Journal of Development Economics >Land and labor allocation under communal tenure: Theory and evidence from China
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Land and labor allocation under communal tenure: Theory and evidence from China

机译：公共任期下的土地和劳动力分配：中国的理论与证据

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This paper studies rural communities' land and labor choices under communal tenure. I develop a theoretical framework to explain why rural communities often adopt practices of labor-contingent land access and frequent land reallocations under communal tenure, and argue that, although these practices reduce cross-household income inequality and improve agricultural production efficiency under imperfect markets, they can nonetheless inefficiently trap labor in agriculture. I rely on a legal reform in 2003 that stopped land reallocations in all Chinese villages and exploit the variation in villages' reallocation practices before the reform to test the model predictions. The results suggest that the elimination of land reallocations increased off-farm labor and household per capita net income by 7% and 6.5% respectively. However, this came at the cost of a 6% reduction in total agricultural output and a significant jump in intra-village income inequality.
机译：本文在公共任期下研究农村社区的土地和劳动力选择。 我开发了一个理论框架，解释为什么农村社区经常采用公共任期下的劳动抵销土地接入和经常土地重新分配的做法，虽然这些做法降低了交叉家庭收入不平等，但在不完善市场下提高农业生产效率。 尽管如此，可以毫不处于农业中的劳动力。 我于2003年依靠法律改革，在改革前停止所有中国村庄的土地重新分配，利用村庄重新分配实践的变化来测试模型预测。 结果表明，消除土地重新分配分别增加了农业劳动力和家庭人均净收入分别为7％和6.5％。 然而，这是由于农业总产量减少6％的成本和村内收入不平等的显着跃迁。

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