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Pricing (and Bidding) Strategies for Delay Differentiated Cloud Services

机译:价格(投标)延迟策略差异化的云服务

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We consider a cloud provider that seeks to maximize its revenue by offering services with different tradeoffs between cost and timeliness of job completion. Spot instances and preemptible instances are examples of such services, with, in both cases, possible service interruptions delaying a job’s completion. Our focus is on exploiting heterogeneity across jobs in terms of value and sensitivity to execution delay, with a joint distribution that determines their relationship across the user population. We characterize optimal (revenue maximizing) pricing strategies and, in the case of spot instances, optimal bidding strategies as well as identify conditions under which bidding at a fixed price is optimal.We showthat correlation between delay sensitivity and job value needs to exceed a certain threshold for a service offering that differentiates based on speed of execution to be beneficial to the provider. We further assess the results’ robustness under more general assumptions, and we offer guidelines for users and providers.
机译:我们考虑一个云提供商,旨在通过提供服务与最大化其收入不同的成本之间的权衡和及时性工作完成。实例的例子这样的服务,这两种情况下,可能的服务中断推迟完成工作。利用在工作方面的异质性价值和对执行延迟,决定他们的联合分布在用户之间的关系。确定最优(收入最大化)定价策略,并在现场实例的情况下,最优报价策略以及识别以一个固定价格投标的条件下是最优的。需要超过一个灵敏度和工作价值一定阈值的服务区分基于执行速度有利于提供者。结果在更一般的鲁棒性假设,我们为用户提供指导方针和提供者。

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