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Efficiency Under Endogenous Information Choice: A Price-Setting Application

机译:内生信息选择下的效率:定价应用

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摘要

Do private incentives to acquire information reflect the full social value of such information? We show that the answer to this question is typically negative in a canonical business cycle setting, where firms set prices under imperfect information about aggregate productivity. The wedge between private and social values of information is related to market power and ex-post inefficiencies in the use of information. The first reduces the private value of information (relative to its social value), while the second raises it. The overall sign of the inefficiency in information acquisition is therefore ambiguous. Implementing the informationally constrained efficient outcome requires a combination of fiscal and monetary policies-specifically, counter-cyclical revenue subsides as well as a monetary policy rule that targets a counter-cyclical aggregate price level.
机译:私人激励获得信息吗反映的社会价值信息?问题通常是消极的规范商业周期设置,公司定价在不完美的聚合信息生产力。社会价值观的相关市场信息权力和事后的使用效率低下信息。的信息(相对于其社会价值),而第二个了。信息采集的效率低下因此模糊。信息约束有效的结果需要财政和货币政策的组合特殊的国家政策,反周期的收入消退以及货币政策规则针对的是一种反周期的总体价格水平。

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